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Abstract 
In hierarchical organizations the role of a team leader often requires making decisions 
which do not necessarily coincide with the majority opinion of the team. However, these 
decisions are final and binding for all team members. We study experimentally why, and 
under which conditions, leaders resort to such decisions. In our experiment, teams are 
presented with several paired lottery choices. They decide by majority voting which lottery 
from the lottery pair they prefer to be played out. After all members of the team have made 
their choices, the team leader is informed about the outcome of the vote and has an 
opportunity either to confirm or to alter the majority decision. We find that leaders 
overrule their teams in 35% of cases and such decisions are primarily driven by divergent 
preferences of leaders and the other team members. Male, younger and more risk seeking 
(as opposed to female, older and more risk averse) leaders overrule decisions of ordinary 
team members more often. We discuss the implications of our findings for the 
management of organizations. 
 
 
JEL classification: C91, C92, D91, M14 
 
Keywords:  leadership, risk attitude, managerial decisions, collective choice, choice 
under risk 
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1 Introduction 
Management of teams in hierarchically structured organizations is a complex and 
fascinating phenomenon. It often involves decision making in stochastic domains such as 
investment, organizational strategy, and market entry to name a few. While team leaders 
should be prepared to set a good example for the members of their team and coordinate 
interactions and information streams within the organization, they also have a 
responsibility of making final judgments and decisions, which we will call managerial 
decisions. These decisions are binding for the whole team and they typically affect the 
team leader stronger than the ordinary team members.1  
Managerial decisions may, however, disregard or even contradict the opinion of the 
ordinary team members (e.g. Solow et al., 2002). For example, team leaders (managers) 
make the majority of decisions on hiring, firing or task delegation without consulting their 
subordinates. In most companies, a CEO or a top manager often has a final say in 
important decisions, even though all members of the board of directors or an expert panel 
participate in strategic discussions on different issues. The leader’s authority to make 
managerial decisions becomes particularly important in situations when members of a team 
cannot reach an agreement. 
While business practices provide substantial evidence that leaders make managerial 
decisions (e.g. Lieberman et al., 1990 and Knott, 2001), the question about factors that 
motivate such decisions remains largely unanswered. We study managerial decision 
making in a controlled laboratory experiment, which allows us to identify the conditions 
and reasons why team leaders may overrule the majority opinion of their team.  
                                                 
1 For example, one can think of team leaders being promoted, or sacked, as a result of their good, or bad, 
decisions. 
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To date, research in economics has largely concentrated on one particular type of 
leadership, i.e. leading by example. Several theoretical studies and experiments on public 
goods games have investigated leading by example in situations with both asymmetric 
(e.g. Hermalin, 1998; Rotemberg and Saloner, 1993, 2000; Vesterlund, 2003; Kobayashi 
and Suchiro, 2005; Potters et al., 2005 and 2007; Andreoni, 2006; and Komai et al., 2007) 
and symmetric (e.g. Güth et al, 20072 and Levati et al., 2007) information structures. Even 
though leading by example is very important in organizations (especially in case of 
informal leadership), the economics literature offers little guidance as to how leaders make 
managerial decisions in situations involving choice under risk.3 In this paper we present a 
simple experiment that aims to answer this question.  
Our approach extends the existing literature in three aspects. First, we propose a new 
design to study leadership in organizations and the factors that induce leaders to make 
managerial decisions in choice under risk. Second, we complement the research on 
leadership by considering leaders who lead by authority and not by example.4 Third, we 
link our analysis of collective choice and managerial decisions under risk with the 
literature on individual decision making. 
                                                 
2 Güth et al. (2007) include one treatment where the leader in a public goods experiment has a power to 
exclude a (non-cooperating) member from participating in the team decision making for one period. 
3 Our analysis if also related to the literature in psychology and economics on decision making in small teams 
(e.g. Teger and Pruitt, 1967; Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969; Davis, 1992; Kerr et al., 1996; Cason and Mui, 
1997; Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998; Bone, 1998; Bone et al., 1999; Cooper and Kagel, 2005; Kocher and 
Sutter, 2005; Kugler et al., 2007; and Rockenbach et al., 2007). Levine and Moreland (1998) provide a 
detailed overview of this stream of literature. While some of these papers focus on decision making in a risky 
environment, all team members have the same decision power. In other words, none of the participants has 
an authority to make decisions that are binding for the entire team. 
4 We also endogenize the election of the leader, adding an additional layer to the study. 
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In our experiment, participants are randomly assigned to teams of three people. All 
members of a team have to choose one lottery from a lottery pair, which they would like to 
be played out at the end of the experiment. However, the team leader makes an ultimate, 
and binding, decision after having observed preferences of the other team members. This 
design allows us to explore whether and to what extent leaders are inclined to overrule the 
decisions of other team members.  
In addition to studying managerial decision making in teams, we let each participant 
choose among lottery pairs by performing an individual decision making task. Therefore, 
we can also relate the choices in the individual decision making task to the choices in the 
team decision making task. This allows us to study whether participants change their 
individual preferences when they are making decisions in a team. 
We find that leaders tend to make decisions in contradiction with the team opinion 
when they have different preferences over risky choices than the majority of the team. 
Moreover, leaders’ choices in the team setting are consistent with their individual 
preferences both when voting in the team on which lottery to implement and when making 
choices in the individual decision making task. Apparently, leader’s attitudes towards risk 
have a significant impact on their behavior. Particularly, we show that the more risk 
seeking the leader is the more likely he or she is to make a decision in contradiction to the 
other team members. We also find that females and older team leaders (as opposed to 
males and younger leaders) are less likely to make managerial decisions that overrule the 
opinion of the others. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description 
of the experimental design, laboratory procedures and our theoretical hypotheses. Section 3 
presents the experimental results. Finally, Section 4 concludes with a general discussion on 
the previous sections. 
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2 Experimental design and theoretical predictions 
2.1 Experimental design 
The experiment consists of two different tasks: (i) an individual task, and (ii) a team 
task. To avoid order effects, we have constructed two experimental treatments. In one 
treatment an individual task is followed by a team task. In the other treatment, the order of 
tasks is reversed. 
We have designed 17 pairs of lotteries with different payoff schemes and risk 
coefficients for leaders and ordinary team members (Table 1). This difference reflects the 
fact that leaders (managers) often face higher risks when making decisions, because 
managerial decisions typically affect the team leader stronger than an ordinary team 
member. 
In the individual task (see the experimental instructions in the Appendix), we elicit 
individual preferences of participants over these pairs of lotteries. Since in the team task 
leaders and ordinary players face different lotteries, we let each subject in the individual 
task make choices as if he or she had a payoff scheme of the leader and the ordinary 
player. Therefore, each participant receives 34 paired lotteries as it is depicted in Table 2. 
Lottery pairs are presented to subjects in a random order. In the majority of lottery pairs 
one of the lotteries (the high-risk lottery) provides a relatively large outcome with 
probability 1/3 and a relatively small outcome with probability 2/3, whereas the other (the 
low-risk lottery) yields a medium outcome with probability 2/3 and a small outcome with 
probability 1/3. 
 
[INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE] 
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In addition to the 34 binary lottery choices subjects are exposed to the procedure of 
Holt and Laury (2002) to measure their individual risk attitudes (see lotteries 18-27 in 
Table 2).5 More precisely, subjects have to make ten choices between a relatively risky and 
a relatively safe lottery. The probabilities for the different outcomes of the lotteries are 
systematically varied from 0.1 to 1. In this procedure the number of safe choices (i.e. 
choosing a relatively safe lottery) can be used as an indicator of risk aversion. 
In the team task subjects are randomly assigned to teams of three people each. After 
that, members of a team are asked to elect a leader.6 For this purpose, all team members 
can communicate with each other using an interactive chat.7 Any participant may propose 
him or herself as a candidate for becoming a team leader.  
Every team has three chat periods to discuss the election of the leader. Each chat 
period lasts three minutes, after which all team members have to submit their (anonymous) 
votes. A team member who receives two votes (i.e. a simple majority) becomes a leader. If 
a simple majority is not reached after the first vote, the team proceeds to the next chat 
period. Teams who fail to determine the leader endogenously (i.e. after three voting 
attempts) are assigned an exogenous leader at random.8  
                                                 
5 Given that the main task and the risk attitude elicitation technique are structurally similar, the Holt and 
Laury (2002) procedure is the most appropriate technique for our analysis. 
6 The reasons for implementing an endogenous selection of leaders are that (i) we wanted to make leadership 
more salient than it would have been by a random draw, and that (ii) the endogenous selection provides us 
with data of an additional interest. 
7 In the beginning of the team task, subjects are assigned identification names Player A, Player B or Player C, 
which they use in the chat. Targeted chat messages to a particular team member are not possible. Subjects are 
not allowed to reveal their identity (through reporting seat number, name, gender, age, courses taken, etc.) or 
to use abusive language in the chat. Otherwise, the content of messages within a team is unrestricted. 
8 The whole procedure is common knowledge. 
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After all leaders have been determined, teams receive 17 consecutive decision 
problems. In each problem they have to choose between paired lotteries. The complete set 
of decision problems is given in Table 3. Although these decision problems are identical to 
the problems used in the individual task, they are shown in a different order and framed 
differently.9  
For each decision problem, all three team members, including the leader, are 
requested to cast an anonymous vote for one of the lotteries in a lottery pair. The team 
leader alone is informed about which lottery is chosen by a majority (i.e. by at least two 
members). After that, the leader has an option to either confirm the majority decision or to 
pick the alternative lottery. This decision is final and determines the payoff of the entire 
team. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
In the team task all ordinary team members receive the same profit.10 The leader, 
however, has a flexible payoff scheme. The intuition behind this scheme is simple. When 
the work of the team produces a successful outcome, the leader is rewarded; otherwise, the 
leader is punished. Therefore, in the majority of decision problems the leader receives a 
higher profit than ordinary team members if the chosen lottery yields its highest possible 
payoff. If the chosen lottery provides the lowest possible payoff the leader receives less 
than the ordinary team members. Therefore, the leader’s authority comes at a cost.11 For 
                                                 
9 In the team task each lottery is framed as a “project”. 
10 This profit depends on the lottery that is chosen/confirmed by the leader, and the random outcome of this 
lottery. 
11 This cost is pointed out in the experimental instructions.  
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control purposes, we also include lotteries where the leader has the same payoff as the 
other team members. 
 
2.2 Experimental procedure 
We conducted six experimental sessions. In three sessions, the individual task was 
followed by the team task. In the other three sessions, we reversed the order of the tasks. 
All sessions were run at the University of Innsbruck in October and November 2006, using 
the experimental software z-Tree 3.0.5 (Fischbacher, 2007).12 A total of 108 subjects took 
part in the experiment. 61% of them were male. The average age of participants was 23 
years. 
Eighteen subjects participated in each session. Each participant had a separate work 
space, which could not be seen by other participants or the experimenter. Each work space 
was equipped with a personal computer, a pen and scratch paper. Built-in digital 
calculators were available on all computer screens during the experiment. Subjects 
received a set of instructions for each task of the experiment separately. Instructions were 
read aloud and subjects had an opportunity to re-read the instructions and ask questions 
about the procedure in private. To avoid possible framing effects, we used neutral language 
(i.e. ordinary team members were called “participants of type 1” and team leaders 
“participants of type 2”). We included an additional questionnaire at the end of the 
experiment to gather information about personal characteristics of the participants. The 
whole procedure took approximately 1.5 hours. 
To avoid wealth effects, we provided payoff information only at the end of the 
experiment. One of the decision problems was selected from each experimental task at 
                                                 
12 Program files with experimental treatments are available from the authors upon request. 
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random and subjects received the payment according to the lottery which they had selected 
during this task. Average earnings amounted to € 20.26. 
 
2.3 Theoretical hypothesis 
One of the main advantages of our experimental design is the simplicity of the 
theoretical prediction. In the individual task, all subjects should reveal their true 
preferences over a menu of presented lotteries. Furthermore, leaders should make the same 
choices in both the individual task and the team task of the experiment when they make 
their final decisions to either confirm or alter the majority vote. Hence, the individual 
preferences over binary lottery choices from the individual task form our prediction for 
leaders’ final decisions in the team task. The reverse is true for the sessions where the team 
task is played before the individual task.13 
The behavior of ordinary players in the team task, however, may be different. If 
ordinary players are fully rational and they expect that the leader is also fully rational, they 
know that their votes in the team task will not have any impact on the final decision. In 
other words, in the final decision, the leader will always choose the lottery according to his 
or her preferences, irrespective of what the other members of the team do. Therefore any 
voting profile obtained during the team vote is an equilibrium.  
However, if ordinary players believe that there is a slight chance that the team leader 
will accommodate the majority choice (e.g. has a preference for conformism), they have a 
strong incentive to reveal their true preference over the lotteries in the team task. In this 
case, ordinary players should make the same choices both in the individual and the team 
tasks of the experiment. 
                                                 
13 Note, however, that the leader may not reveal his or her true preference during the team vote. This decision 
is simply “cheap talk”, because it has no consequences for the final payoff. 
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In our setting, managerial decisions (when the leader’s final decision is at odds with 
the majority vote of the team) may emerge in two cases. First, ordinary team members may 
vote for a different lottery than the leader during the team task of the experiment. Second, 
the vote of the ordinary team members in the team task may contradict with the leader’s 
individual preferences (i.e. with his or her choice in the individual task).14 One can think of 
two different scenarios when this may occur. One possibility is that the leader has 
distinctively different risk attitudes compared with the ordinary team members. For 
example, the leader is risk seeking and opts for a high-risk lottery and ordinary members 
are risk averse and choose a low-risk lottery, or vice versa. Another possibility is that all 
team members have similar risk attitudes, but because leaders face different lotteries with 
higher possible payoffs in the majority of cases, the role of a leader per se suggests a 
different behavior.  
Notice that if the leader confirms the decision made by the simple majority of the 
team, it does not necessarily indicate that he or she is influenced by the information about 
the outcome of the vote. Particularly, if during the team task the leader’s vote is in line 
with the simple majority decision or if the team votes for the same lottery that the leader 
has chosen in the individual task, then it would appear that he or she simply behaves 
according to his or her individual preferences. Our empirical analysis accounts for all these 
possibilities. 
 
                                                 
14 Note that the two cases do not necessarily exclude each other. 
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3 Experimental results 
3.1 Risk attitudes of participants 
Table 4 reports the results of the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure used to elicit 
individual risk attitudes. We consider the choices of 92 out of 108 participants, who have 
made their decisions consistently. These subjects have switched from the safe choice to the 
risky choice at most once (i.e. from left to right in the green portion of Table 2).15 Overall, 
consistent subjects made, on average, 5.64 safe choices (left-hand side of Table 4), 
indicating a slight degree of risk aversion in the aggregate. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Table 4 also shows risk attitudes for team leaders and ordinary team members 
separately. Apparently, while the majority of ordinary team members exhibited at least a 
slight degree of risk aversion, a large fraction of leaders (almost 39%) were risk neutral. 
The results of Mann-Whitney-U (also known as Wilcoxon rank-sum or Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney) tests (Wilcoxon, 1945; Mann and Whitney, 1947) suggest that leaders were 
significantly less risk averse than ordinary team members (p-value = 0.049). 
 
Result 1: On average, team leaders are less risk averse than ordinary team members. 
 
                                                 
15 The other 16 (out of 108) subjects have switched back and forth more than once and, therefore, cannot be 
classified in terms of their risk preferences. 
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3.2 Endogenous selection of the team leader 
There were 31 out of 36 teams that were successful in electing a leader. Out of them, 
25 (81%) chose the leader in the first vote (by simple majority voting), 5 (16%) needed 
two voting rounds, and 1 team (3%) agreed on a leader only in the third voting round. 5 
teams could not come to an agreement and their leaders were determined by a random 
draw. 
Even though assessing the content of team discussions is in many ways subjective, 
one particularly noteworthy result is that leaders who were elected on the first try self-
selected for the leading roles. In other words, these subjects proposed themselves as 
candidates for the leader’s position within the first seconds of the chat.16 This finding, 
reconciled with the fact that leaders appear to be on average more risk seeking than the 
ordinary team members, suggests an interesting connection between risk attitudes and the 
emergence of leadership in teams.  
 
Result 2: The majority of teams agree on a leader in the first chat period. 
 
3.3 Consistency of decisions across the two tasks of the experiment 
We now check the consistency of decisions across the two tasks of the experiment. 
We have not found any significant impact of the order of tasks (individual task first vs. 
team task first) on the choices of lotteries.17 Therefore, we can pool the data across all 6 
sessions. 
                                                 
16 During the chat, successfully elected participants typically do not promise that they will confirm the 
majority decision of their teams if they become leaders. 
17 This statement is supported by our results in the next section. Please, refer to Section 3.4 and Table 6. 
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Decisions of an ordinary team member are consistent throughout the experiment if he 
or she votes for the same lottery both in the individual and in the team task. According to 
column OC (ordinary consistency) in Table 5, 75.7% of ordinary members’ choices can be 
classified as consistent. An inconsistency rate of about 25% is very typical in the 
experimental literature, when the subjects are asked to answer the same binary choice 
questions twice (e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994). This suggests that ordinary team members tend 
to reveal their true preferences during the team vote, even though they have no apparent 
reason to do so unless they believe that a leader might have a tendency to follow the 
majority (as we discuss in section 2.3 above).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
For team leaders it is necessary to develop a different definition of consistency 
because leaders face the same, though differently framed, decision problems on three 
occasions – once in the individual task and twice in the team task, i.e. when they vote on 
the preferred lottery together with the team and when they make the final decision. 
Columns LT (leader in a team), LF (leader final) and CTU (consistency throughout) in 
Table 5 report three different classifications of consistency. Out of the three, CTU allows 
for the least amount of flexibility, demanding from the leader to choose the same lottery on 
all three occasions. Note from the bottom row of Table 5 that 63.7% of leaders’ choices are 
consistent in this strict sense.  
Column FRE (framing effect) in Table 5 shows the percentage of decisions when a 
leader makes the same choices in the team task but a different choice in the individual task. 
In other words, FRE is a measure of leaders’ inconsistency across tasks, and it is 
comparable with (100%-OC) for the ordinary players. Notably, leaders show a slightly 
 15
lower degree of inconsistency (FRE = 22.5%) than ordinary players and subjects in 
comparable repeated binary choice experiments (Hey and Orme, 1994). 
Leaders were more consistent in their choices during the vote in the team task 
(73.7%, see Table 5, column LT) than they were after observing the outcome of the 
majority vote (67.5%, see Table 5, column LF). The result of a chi-square test of 
association (Fisher, 1922) between these two variables (taken in absolute terms) reveals 
that the difference in proportions is statistically significant (p-value = 0.02). Therefore, it 
appears that the feedback about the outcome of the team vote has a significant impact on 
leaders’ decisions. This result suggests that team leaders in our experiment may indeed 
have a preference for conformism.18 
Column CHM (changing mind) in Table 5 shows that leaders confirm the results of 
the majority vote when it contradicts with their own voting decisions in the team task in 
13.7% of cases. Notice that this fact alone cannot be interpreted as an evidence of 
conformism or any other social preference. Since leaders understand that their decisions 
during the team vote are not binding, they may cast their vote for any lottery during the 
vote (engage in a “cheap talk”) or simply pick the wrong lottery by mistake. However, 
taking into account that LT is greater than LF (see Table 5) CHM may provide additional 
evidence that leaders may regard majority opinions and adapt to them. 
 
                                                 
18 Several studies provide a theoretical background for the notion of conformism within the domain of social 
learning models (e.g., Bala and Goyal, 1998 and 2001). However, investigating conformism is a relatively 
new objective in experimental economics (e.g. Bardsley and Sausgruber, 2005). Note, however, that the 
focus of our study is on the determinants of managerial decisions and not on conformism. 
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Result 3: Consistency of decisions across the two tasks is high both for leaders and 
for ordinary team members. However, we also find evidence that leaders confirm team 
majority decisions even when these decisions diverge from leaders’ individual preferences. 
 
3.4 Determinants of managerial decisions 
In the following section we concentrate on managerial decisions, i.e. situations when 
the team leader has chosen a different lottery than the simple majority of team members. 
Column MD (managerial decisions) in Table 5 shows that in 35.3% of cases leaders 
overrule the other two members in their team. We use logit regression analysis to 
determine the impact of different explanatory variables on the likelihood of a team leader 
making such managerial decisions. The probability that leader i makes a managerial 
decision j is given by  
{ }{ }jiji2ji1
j
i
j
i2
j
i1j
i X...2X1Xexp1
X...2X1Xexpp
N
N
N
N
βββ
βββ
++++
+++= . (1) 
Explanatory variables XNX ,...,1  are described in Table 6 and regression coefficients 
Nββ ,...,1  are estimated by minimizing the log-likelihood function 
( ) ( )jiij ijjiij p-1IpILL ln1ln∑ −+= , where 1=ijI  if leader i made a managerial decision j 
in contradiction with the team vote and 0=ijI  if leader i confirmed the team decision.19 
The results of the econometric analysis are given in Table 6. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
                                                 
19 We used the Matlab 6.5 package for the estimation. Program files are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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Consistent with our theoretical hypothesis, the regression results suggest that more 
than 70% of the variability in the data can be explained by the explanatory variable X1. 
This variable indicates whether the leader has voted for a different lottery than the two 
other members in the team during the team task of the experiment. The variable X2 is also 
significant. It is equal to 1 if the two ordinary team members vote for a different lottery 
than the leader has chosen in the individual task and to zero otherwise. 
Interestingly, risk seeking leaders are more likely to resort to managerial decisions 
that overrule the other team members (see variable X5). We also find that two personal 
characteristics – gender (X3) and age (X4) – are significant. Younger leaders are more 
likely to resort to decisions contrary to the team. Furthermore, males are more likely to 
make managerial decisions and overrule the team than females.  
Dummy variable X6 is constructed to check whether the order of tasks matter. We 
find that there is no significant difference in decisions irrespective of the order of tasks.20  
 
Result 4: Risk seeking leaders, male leaders and younger leaders are more likely to 
resort to managerial decisions that overrule the other team members . 
 
4 Discussion 
This paper proposes a new framework for research on leadership, which takes into 
account the authority of leaders who enforce operational routine (e.g. Knott, 2001), 
coordinate information streams (e.g. Harris and Raviv, 2002) and fulfill their function of 
supervision (e.g. Jago, 1982) in hierarchically structured organizations. Our approach is 
distinct from the existing literature, which primarily concentrates on the effects of 
leadership in voluntary contribution experiments with a leader-follower setting. In these 
                                                 
20 This allows us to pool data from all 6 sessions of the experiment to conduct our analysis (see section 3.3). 
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studies (e.g. Andreoni, 2006; Potters et al., 2005; Güth et al., 2007) leadership is largely 
viewed (and established) as a team coordination device under certainty.  
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we analyze leadership in a risky 
environment, which is one of the key elements of managerial decision making. Second, we 
consider leadership as a formal authority where the leader makes the ultimate decision for 
his or her team. These two important aspects of leadership have been largely understated in 
previous research. 
Our design resembles many decision making situations when managers have an 
opportunity to consult their teams, but when they are personally responsible for making the 
final decisions on risky prospects. However, these decisions may contradict with the 
majority opinion of the team. We call such decisions managerial decisions. 
In our experiment we show that leaders are willing to take over responsibility and 
overrule their team members quite frequently. The main source for overruling appears to 
be the divergence of opinions between the leader and the team during the vote. However, 
gender, age and risk attitudes also play an important role.  
We find that younger leaders and male leaders are more likely to overrule the 
majority than older leaders and female leaders. Our result that age influences managerial 
decisions is in line with the literature on personality characteristics of upper level 
managers, showing that older executives behave more conservatively than their younger 
counterparts (e.g. Hambrick and Mason, 1984; MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986). The 
gender impact provides an interesting insight for formulating corporate strategies. It might 
seem sensible for hierarchical organizations with a team-oriented philosophy of decision 
making to promote women to leadership positions, since they are more likely to take into 
account the opinion of their team as opposed to men. 
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Finally, we have also found that less risk averse team leaders are more likely to 
overrule the majority decisions of ordinary team members. Moreover, teams seem to elect 
more risk seeking people for the leadership positions even without knowing their attitudes 
towards risk. It is interesting to note that less risk averse team members are those that 
volunteer more quickly for becoming a leader, which creates a link between risk attitudes 
and leadership. It is left to future research to further examine the relation between risk 
attitudes and the emergence of the leadership in hierarchical organizations. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 Experimental Lottery Pairs* 
Lottery 
pair 
Team 
earnings 
Earnings for 
ordinary 
player 
Earnings 
for the 
leader 
Probability 
Expected value 
of the lottery 
for ordinary 
player 
Expected 
value of the 
lottery for  
the 
leader 
Absolute 
difference in 
expected value 
between two 
lotteries for 
ordinary player 
Absolute 
difference in 
expected value 
between two 
lotteries for the 
leader 
Risk 
coefficient 
(σ ) for 
ordinary 
player 
Risk 
coefficient 
(σ ) for the 
leader 
30.3 7.9 14.5 1/3 
7.2 3.1 1 2/3 
4.7 5.5 2.3 6.4 
9.3 3.9 1.5 1/3 
1 
16.2 5.1 6 2/3 4.7 4.5 
0 1 
0.6 2.1 
38.2 9.7 18.8 1/3 
3.1 1.3 0.5 2/3 
4.1 6.6 4.0 8.6 
9.2 3.5 2.2 1/3 
2 
14.6 4.4 5.8 2/3 4.1 4.6 
0 2 
0.4 1.7 
39.1 9 21.1 1/3 
8.8 3.6 1.6 2/3 
5.4 8.1 2.6 9.2 
11.5 4.8 1.9 1/3 
3 
18.1 5.7 6.7 2/3 5.4 5.1 
0 3 
0.4 2.3 
35 9 17 1/3 
4.9 2 0.9 2/3 
4.3 6.3 3.3 7.6 
5.2 2 1.2 1/3 
4 
18.3 5.5 7.3 2/3 4.3 5.3 
0 1 
1.7 2.9 
36.4 8.7 19 1/3 
6.7 2.7 1.3 2/3 
4.7 7.2 2.8 8.3 
9.6 3.9 1.8 1/3 
5 
17.1 5.1 6.9 2/3 4.7 5.2 
0 2 
0.6 2.4 
47.1 11.7 23.7 1/3 
4.5 1.8 0.9 2/3 
5.1 8.5 4.7 10.8 
10.5 4.3 1.9 1/3 
6 
18.3 5.5 7.3 2/3 5.1 5.5 
0 3 
0.6 2.6 
25.7 7.9 9.9 1/3 
4.5 2 0.5 2/3 
4.0 3.6 2.8 4.4 
7.7 2.9 1.9 1/3 
7 
10.5 3 4.5 2/3 3.0 3.6 
1 0 
0.1 1.2 
16 4 8 1/3 
8 3 2 2/3 
3.3 4 0.5 2.8 
16 7 2 1/3 
8 
14 4.5 5 2/3 5.3 
4 
 
2 0 
1.2 1.4 
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Lottery 
pair 
Team 
earnings 
Earnings for 
ordinary 
player 
Earnings 
for the 
leader 
Probability 
Expected value 
of the lottery 
for ordinary 
player 
Expected 
value of the 
lottery for  
the 
leader 
Absolute 
difference in 
expected value 
between two 
lotteries for 
ordinary player 
Absolute 
difference in 
expected value 
between two 
lotteries for the 
leader 
Risk 
coefficient 
(σ ) for 
ordinary 
player 
Risk 
coefficient 
(σ ) for the 
leader 
29 6.6 15.8 1/3 
5.2 1.9 1.4 2/3 
3.5 6.2 2.2 6.8 
23 7.3 8.4 2/3 
9 
11.4 4.8 1.8 1/3 6.5 6.2 
3 0 
1.2 3.1 
24.3 7.7 8.9 1/3 
8.7 3.1 2.5 2/3 
4.6 4.6 2.2 3.0 
10.7 4.3 2.1 1/3 
10 
15.5 4.8 5.9 2/3 4.6 4.6 
0 0 
0.2 1.8 
27.8 8.9 10 1/3 
3.7 1.5 0.7 2/3 
4.0 3.8 3.5 4.4 
7.8 2.9 2 1/3 
11 
12.2 3 6.2 2/3 3.0 4.8 
1 1 
0.0 2.0 
30.6 10.1 10.4 1/3 
6.6 2.9 0.8 2/3 
5.3 4 3.4 4.5 
9 3.1 2.8 1/3 
12 
14.4 3.4 7.6 2/3 3.3 6 
2 2 
0.1 2.3 
31 10.2 10.6 1/3 
10.4 4.9 0.6 2/3 
6.7 3.9 2.5 4.7 
8.2 3 2.2 1/3 
13 
17.3 4 9.3 2/3 3.7 6.9 
3 3 
0.5 3.3 
13.5 4.5 4.5 1/3 
6 2 2 2/3 
2.8 2.8 1.2 1.2 
10.6 1.7 7.2 2/3 
14 
4.3 0.6 3.1 1/3 1.3 5.8 
1.5 3 
0.5 1.9 
21 4.5 12 1/3 
9 2 5 2/3 
2.8 7.3 1.2 3.3 
9 3 3 1/3 
15 
15 5 5 2/3 4.3 4.3 
1.5 3 
0.9 0.9 
10.5 3.5 3.5 1/3 
6.6 2.2 2.2 2/3 
2.6 2.6 0.6 0.6 
8.6 4.1 0.4 1/3 
16 
14.3 6.4 1.5 2/3 5.6 1.1 
3 1.5 
1.1 0.5 
20.9 9.2 2.5 1/3 
11.3 4.9 1.5 2/3 
6.3 1.8 2.0 0.5 
6 2 2 1/3 
17 
12 4 4 2/3 3.3 3.3 
3 1.5 
0.9 0.9 
* All earnings are in euro.
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Table 2 Lottery Pairs Used in the Individual Task of the Experiment* 
Lottery 
pair Option 1 Option 2 
Absolute 
expected 
payoff 
difference 
1 1/3 of €8.90, 2/3 of €1.50 2/3 of €3.00, 1/3 of €2.90 €1 
2 1/3 of €4.50, 2/3 of €2.00 2/3 of €7.20, 1/3 of €3.10 €3 
3 1/3 of €7.90, 2/3 of €3.10 2/3 of €5.10, 1/3 of €3.90 €0 
4 1/3 of €17.00, 2/3 of €0.90 2/3 of €7.30, 1/3 of €1.20 €1 
5 1/3 of €7.70, 2/3 of €3.10 2/3 of €4.80, 1/3 of €4.30 €0 
6 1/3 of €10.60, 2/3 of €0.60 2/3 of €9.30, 1/3 of €2.20 €3 
7 1/3 of €9.00, 2/3 of €2.00 2/3 of €5.50, 1/3 of €2.00 €0 
8 1/3 of €19.00, 2/3 of €1.30 2/3 of €6.90, 1/3 of €1.80 €2 
9 1/3 of €9.20, 2/3 of €4.90 2/3 of €4.00, 1/3 of €2.00 €3 
10 1/3 of €10.40, 2/3 of €0.80 2/3 of €7.60, 1/3 of €2.80 €2 
11 1/3 of €11.70, 2/3 of €1.80 2/3 of €5.50, 1/3 of €4.30 €0 
12 1/3 of €9.90, 2/3 of €0.50 2/3 of €4.50, 1/3 of €1.90 €0 
13 1/3 of €4.00, 2/3 of €3.00 2/3 of €4.50, 1/3 of €7.00 €2 
14 1/3 of €12.00, 2/3 of €5.00 2/3 of €5.00, 1/3 of €3.00 €3 
15 1/3 of €9.70, 2/3 of €1.30 2/3 of €4.40, 1/3 of €3.50 €0 
16 1/3 of €21.10, 2/3 of €1.60 2/3 of €6.70, 1/3 of €1.90 €3 
17 1/3 of €3.50, 2/3 of €2.20 2/3 of €6.40, 1/3 of €4.10 €3 
18 1/10 of €2.00, 9/10 of €1.60 1/10 of €3.85, 9/10 of €0.10 €1.17 
19 2/10 of €2.00, 8/10 of €1.60 2/10 of €3.85, 8/10 of €0.10 €0.83 
20 3/10 of €2.00, 7/10 of €1.60 3/10 of €3.85, 7/10 of €0.10 €0.50 
21 4/10 of €2.00, 6/10 of €1.60 4/10 of €3.85, 6/10 of €0.10 €0.16 
22 5/10 of €2.00, 5/10 of €1.60 5/10 of €3.85, 5/10 of €0.10 €0.18 
23 6/10 of €2.00, 4/10 of €1.60 6/10 of €3.85, 4/10 of €0.10 €0.51 
24 7/10 of €2.00, 3/10 of €1.60 7/10 of €3.85, 3/10 of €0.10 €0.85 
25 8/10 of €2.00, 2/10 of €1.60 8/10 of €3.85, 2/10 of €0.10 €1.18 
26 9/10 of €2.00, 1/10 of €1.60 9/10 of €3.85, 1/10 of €0.10 €1.52 
27 10/10 of €2.00, 0/10 of €1.60 10/10 of €3.85, 0/10 of €0.10 €1.85 
28 1/3 of €8.00, 2/3 of €2.00 2/3 of €5.00, 1/3 of €2.00 €0 
29 1/3 of €6.60, 2/3 of €1.90 2/3 of €7.30, 1/3 of €4.80 €3 
30 1/3 of €3.50, 2/3 of €2.20 2/3 of €1.50, 1/3 of €0.40 €1.5 
31 1/3 of €4.50, 2/3 of €2.00 2/3 of €5.00, 1/3 of €3.00 €1.5 
32 1/3 of €23.70, 2/3 of €0.90 2/3 of €7.30, 1/3 of €1.90 €3 
33 1/3 of €8.70, 2/3 of €2.70 2/3 of €5.10, 1/3 of €3.90 €0 
34 1/3 of €15.80, 2/3 of €1.40 2/3 of €8.40, 1/3 of €1.80 €0 
35 1/3 of €7.90, 2/3 of €2.00 2/3 of €3.00, 1/3 of €2.90 €1 
36 1/3 of €10.00, 2/3 of €0.70 2/3 of €6.20, 1/3 of €2.00 €1 
37 1/3 of €10.20, 2/3 of €4.90 2/3 of €4.00, 1/3 of €3.00 €3 
38 1/3 of €8.90, 2/3 of €2.50 2/3 of €5.90, 1/3 of €2.10 €0 
39 1/3 of €9.00, 2/3 of €3.60 2/3 of €5.70, 1/3 of €4.80 €0 
40 1/3 of €18.80, 2/3 of €0.50 2/3 of €5.80, 1/3 of €2.20 €2 
41 1/3 of €4.50, 2/3 of €2.00 2/3 of €1.70, 1/3 of €0.60 €1.5 
42 1/3 of €2.50, 2/3 of €1.50 2/3 of €4.00, 1/3 of €2.00 €1.5 
43 1/3 of €10.10, 2/3 of €2.90 2/3 of €3.40, 1/3 of €3.10 €2 
44 1/3 of €14.50, 2/3 of €1.00 2/3 of €6.00, 1/3 of €1.50 €1 
 
* Lottery pairs in light grey shaded rows refer to the lottery pairs with ordinary players’ 
payoff scheme, white-shaded rows to those with a leader’s payoff scheme, and dark grey 
shaded ones to lottery pairs of Holt and Laury (2002). 
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Table 3 Lottery Pairs Used in the Team Task of the Experiment* 
Problem Initial number of lottery 
pair (from Table 1) 
Project A Project B 
1 7 
Your team receives €25.70 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €7.90  and type 2 player 
receives €9.90)  
OR 
your team receives €4.50 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €2 and type 2 player 
receives €0.50) 
Your team receives €10.50  with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 
player receives €3 and type 2 
player receives €4.50) 
OR 
your team receives €7.70 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 
player receives €2.90 and type 2 
player receives €1.90 
2 4 
Your team receives €35  with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €9 and type 2 player 
receives €17) 
OR 
your team receives €4.90 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €2 and type 2 player 
receives €0.90) 
Your team receives €18.30 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 
player receives €5.50 and type 2 
player receives €7.30) 
OR 
your team receives €5.20 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 
player receives €2 and type 2 
player receives €1.20) 
3 6 
Your team receives €47.1 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €11.7 and type 2 player 
receives €23.7) 
OR 
your team receives €4.50 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €1.80 and type 2 player 
receives €0.90) 
Your team receives €18.30 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 
player receives €5.50 and type 2 
player receives €7.30) 
OR 
your team receives €10.50 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 
player receives €4.30 and type 2 
player receives €1.90) 
4 3 
Your team receives €39.10 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €9 and type 2 player 
receives €21.10) 
OR 
your team receives €8.80 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €3.60 and type 2 player 
receives €1.60) 
Your team receives €18.10 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 
player receives €5.70 and type 2 
player receives €6.70) 
OR 
your team receives €11.50 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 
player receives €4.80 and type 2 
player receives €1.90) 
5 9 
Your team receives €29 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €6.60 and type 2 player 
receives €15.80) 
OR 
your team receives €5.20 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €1.90 and type 2 player 
receives €1.40) 
Your team receives €23 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 
player receives €7.30 and type 2 
player receives €8.40) 
OR 
your team receives €11.40 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 
player receives €4.80 and type 2 
player receives €1.80) 
 
* Type 1 player refers to “ordinary player”, type 2 player refers to “leader” 
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Table 3 continued 
Problem Initial number of 
lottery pair (from 
Table 1) 
Project A Project B 
6 13 
Your team receives €31 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €10.20 and type 2 player 
receives €10.60) 
OR 
your team receives €10.40 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €4.90 and type 2 player 
receives €0.60) 
 
Your team receives €17.30 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €4 and type 2 player 
receives €9.30) 
OR 
your team receives €8.20 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €3 and type 2 player 
receives €2.20) 
 
7 12 
Your team receives €30.60 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €10.10 and type 2 player 
receives €10.40) 
OR 
your team receives €6.60 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €2.90 and type 2 player 
receives €0.80) 
Your team receives €14.40 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €3.40 and type 2 player 
receives €7.60) 
OR 
your team receives €9 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €3.10 and type 2 player 
receives €2.80) 
8 8 
Your team receives €16 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €4 and type 2 player 
receives €8)  
OR 
your team receives €8 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €3 and type 2 player 
receives €2) 
Your team receives €14 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €4.50 and type 2 player 
receives €5) 
OR 
your team receives €16 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €7 and type 2 player 
receives €2) 
9 10 
Your team receives €24.30 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €7.70 and type 2 player 
receives €8.90)  
OR 
your team receives €8.70 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €3.10 and type 2 player 
receives €2.50) 
Your team receives €15.50 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €4.80 and type 2 player 
receives €5.90)  
OR 
your team receives €10.70 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €4.30 and type 2 player 
receives €2.10) 
10 2 
Your team receives €38.20 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €9.70 and type 2 player 
receives €18.80) 
OR 
your team receives €3.10 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €1.30 and type 2 player 
receives €0.50) 
Your team receives €14.60 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €4.40 and type 2 player 
receives €5.80) 
OR 
your team receives €9.20 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €3.50 and type 2 player 
receives €2.20) 
11 17 Your team receives €20.90 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €9.20 and type 2 player 
receives €2.50) 
OR 
your team receives €11.30 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €4.90 and type 2 player 
receives €1.50) 
Your team receives €12 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €4 and type 2 player 
receives €4) 
OR 
your team receives €6 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €2 and type 2 player 
receives €2) 
* Type 1 player refers to “ordinary player”, type 2 player refers to “leader” 
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Table 3 continued 
Problem Initial number of 
lottery pair (from 
Table 1) 
Project A Project B 
12 15 
Your team receives €21 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 
player receives €4.50 and type 2 
player receives €12)  
OR 
your team receives €9 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 
player receives €2 and type 2 
player receives €5) 
Your team receives €15 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €5 and type 2 player 
receives €5)  
OR 
your team receives €9 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €3 and type 2 player 
receives €3) 
13 11 
Your team receives €27.80 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 
player receives €8.90 and type 2 
player receives €10) 
OR 
your team receives €3.70 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 
player receives €1.50 and type 2 
player receives €0.70) 
Your team receives €12.20 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €3 and type 2 player 
receives €6.20) 
OR 
your team receives €7.80 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €2.90 and type 2 player 
receives €2) 
14 5 
Your team receives €36.40 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 
player receives €8.70 and type 2 
player receives €19) 
OR 
your team receives €6.70 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 
player receives €2.70 and type 2 
player receives €1.30) 
Your team receives €17.10 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €5.10 and type 2 player 
receives €6.90) 
OR 
your team receives €9.60 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €3.90 and type 2 player 
receives €1.80) 
15 14 
Your team receives €13.50 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 
player receives €4.50 and type 2 
player receives €4.50) 
OR 
your team receives €6 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 
player receives €2 and type 2 
player receives €2) 
Your team receives €10.60 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €1.70 and type 2 player 
receives €7.20)  
OR 
your team receives €4.30 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €0.60 and type 2 player 
receives €3.10) 
16 1 
Your team receives €30.30 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 
player receives €7.90 and type 2 
player receives €14.50) 
OR 
your team receives €7.20 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 
player receives €3.10 and type 2 
player receives €1) 
Your team receives €16.20 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €5.10 and type 2 player 
receives €6) 
OR 
your team receives €9.30 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €3.90 and type 2 player 
receives €1.50) 
17 16 
Your team receives €10.50 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 
player receives €3.50 and type 2 
player receives €3.50) 
OR 
your team receives €6.60 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 
player receives €2.20 and type 2 
player receives €2.20) 
Your team receives €14.30 with 
probability 2/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €6.40 and type 2 player 
receives €1.50) 
OR 
your team receives €8.60 with 
probability 1/3 (each type 1 player 
receives €4.10 and type 2 player 
receives €0.40) 
* Type 1 player refers to “ordinary player”, type 2 player refers to “leader” 
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Table 4 Risk Attitudes of Participants 
Constant relative risk aversion characterization Number of … 
Number of safe 
choices in Holt and 
Laury (2002) test 
CRRA coefficient 
(Description) 
Participants 
(%) 
Leaders (%) 
 
Ordinary team 
members (%) 
0 r<-0.95  (highly risk loving) 2 (2.2%) - 2 (3.3%) 
3 -0.49<r<-0.15 (risk loving) 3 (3.3%) 1 (3.2%) 2 (3.3%) 
4 -0.15<r<0.15 (risk neutral) 20 (21.7%) 12 (38.7%) 8 (13.1%) 
5 0.15<r<0.41 (slightly risk averse) 20 (21.7%) 5 (16.1%) 15 (24.6%) 
6 0.41<r<0.68 (risk averse) 21 (22.8%) 6 (19.4%) 15 (24.6%) 
7 0.68<r<0.97 (very risk averse) 13 (14.1%) 3 (9.7%) 10 (16.4%) 
8 0.97<r<1.37 (highly risk averse) 5 (5.4%) 2 (6.5%) 3 (4.9%) 
9 or 10 1.37<r (stay in bed) 8 (8.7%) 2 (6.5%) 6 (9.8%) 
Average of safe choices 5.64 5.39 5.77 
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Table 5 Consistency of Decisions (in percent)* 
 
 
Lottery Pair OC LT  LF MD CHM FRE CTU 
1 66.7 69.4 63.9 25.0 11.1 27.8 61.1 
2 68.1 75.0 72.2 30.6 2.8 25.0 72.2 
3 68.1 69.4 55.6 30.6 19.4 27.8 52.8 
4 48.6 63.9 58.3 25.0 22.2 27.8 50.0 
5 69.4 83.3 69.4 36.1 13.9 16.7 69.4 
6 69.4 66.7 61.1 13.9 16.7 27.8 55.6 
7 62.5 52.8 38.9 13.9 19.4 44.4 36.1 
8 91.7 75.0 69.4 13.9 5.6 25.0 69.4 
9 95.8 66.7 66.7 13.9 16.7 25.0 58.3 
10 56.9 55.6 63.9 16.7 13.9 33.3 52.8 
11 72.2 72.2 61.1 22.2 11.1 27.8 61.1 
12 79.2 69.4 69.4 38.9 11.1 25.0 63.9 
13 86.1 72.2 77.8 61.1 11.1 19.4 69.4 
14 95.8 86.1 77.8 72.2 8.3 13.9 77.8 
15 88.9 91.7 77.8 63.9 19.4 5.6 75.0 
16 83.3 94.4 83.3 63.9 11.1 5.6 83.3 
17 84.7 88.9 80.6 58.3 19.4 5.6 75.0 
Total 75.7 73.7 67.5 35.3 13.7 22.5 63.7 
 
* Abbreviations are explained below: 
OC (“ordinary consistency”) – percentage of decisions that ordinary team members have 
made consistently in the individual and team tasks of the experiment per lottery pair. 
LT (“leader in a team”) – percentage of decisions in the team vote of the experiment that 
leaders have made consistently with their decisions in the individual task per lottery 
pair. 
LF (“leader final”) – percentage of final decisions that team leaders have made consistently 
with their choices in the individual task of the experiment per lottery pair. 
MD (“managerial decisions”) – percentage of managerial decisions per lottery pair where 
the leader overrules the majority vote within the team. 
CHM (“changing mind”) – percentage of decisions when a leader makes a managerial 
decision different from his or her vote in the team. 
FRE (“framing effect”) – percentage of decisions when a leader makes the same choices in 
the team task, but a different choice in the individual task. 
CTU (“consistency throughout”) – percentage of leader’s decisions that are consistent at all 
three decision points. 
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Table 6 Results of Multinomial Logit Regression (N=612) 
 
Explanatory 
variable Description 
Regression 
coefficient  
(standard 
error) 
Regression 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Constant Constant 2.5313 (2.0654) 
-3.2959*** 
(0.294) 
Decision 
contradiction 
(X1) 
1 – decision of the team is different 
from leader’s decision in the team 
vote; 0 – otherwise. 
4.0293*** 
(0.3487) 
4.3373*** 
(0.3244) 
Preference 
contradiction 
(X2) 
1 – decision of the team is different 
from leader’s decision in the 
individual task; 0 – otherwise. 
1.4017*** 
(0.3542)  
Gender dummy 
(X3) 1- female; 0 – male.  
-0.4755* 
(0.2805)  
Age (X4) Self-reported age of subjects. -0.2314** (0.0823)  
Risk attitudes 
rank dummy 
(X5) 
A scale from 0 (risk seeking) to 9 
(risk averse), based on the number 
of safe choices made in Holt and 
Laury (2002) risk attitudes test 
-0.2129** 
(0.0909)  
Sequence 
dummy (X6) 
0 – first sequence (individual task is 
played first and team task second), 1 
– second sequence (team task is 
played first and individual task is 
played second) 
-0.0586 
(0.2912)  
Log-likelihood -194.8753 -210.1838 
McFadden’s likelihood ratio index 0.5406 0.5045 
Veall and Zimmermann R2 0.7374 0.7084 
 
* Significant at 0.05 significance level 
** Significant at 0.01 significance level 
*** Significant at 0.001 significance level 
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Appendix 
Sample Experimental Instructions 
[Not necessarily for publication; can be made available as an on-line supplement] 
 
 
Dear participant, 
 
Welcome to our experiment on decision making. If you carefully follow these simple 
instructions, you will earn a considerable amount of money. The money you will earn in 
this experiment is yours to keep and will be paid to you privately and in cash at the end of 
the experiment. The experiment will last approximately one hour. Your payoff will 
depend only on your decisions and the realization of random events. 
 
The experiment consists of two parts. The instructions for Part 1 are given below. You will 
receive instructions for Part 2 after you have completed Part1. These instructions will be 
read to you aloud and then you will have an opportunity to study them on your own. If you 
have a question about the content of the instructions, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will answer your question in private. Please do not talk or communicate 
with other participants during the experiment. Irrespective of your performance in the 
experiment, you will be paid a show-up fee of €3.00. 
 
Part 1 (Individual task) 
 
You will be given 44 problems and in each problem you need to choose between two 
lotteries. The problems will appear on your computer screen in three teams of 17, 10 and 
17 problems respectively. Please, take your time and read each problem carefully. The 
example of a typical problem is given below: 
 
Sample Problem 12 
 
Lottery X Lottery Y Your choice is 
You receive  
€9 with probability 1/3 or 
€2 with probability 2/3 
 
You receive  
€4 with probability 2/3 or 
€3 with probability 1/3 
 
Lottery X Lottery Y  
 
 
Your payoff in this part is determined at the end of Part 3 of the experiment, based on 
the outcome of the lotteries that you have chosen. First, the computer program will 
generate a random number from 1 to 44. This number will determine one of 44 problems. 
This problem (together with your choice) will reappear on your computer screen. Then the 
computer program will simulate the lottery you have chosen and reveal the outcome on 
your screen. The outcome of this lottery will determine your payoff.  
 
For example, suppose that the computer program has generated a random number 12 and 
problem 12 presented above reappears on your screen. And suppose that you have chosen 
Lottery X in this problem. Then the computer program will simulate Lottery X and reveal 
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your payoff (either €9 or €2). Your payoff will be paid out in cash at the end of the 
experiment along with your earnings from Part 2 and Part 3.  
 
Part 2 (Team task) 
 
Part 2 of the experiment consists of 17 rounds. In the beginning of Part 2 you will be 
randomly assigned to a team of 3 people. The composition of your team is fixed for the 
duration of this part of the experiment. Each team should consist of 2 players of type 1 and 
one player of type 2. Initially, all team members are assigned type 1. You need to elect one 
member of the team to be a type 2 player.  
 
Any member of the team can propose him- or herself as a candidate for becoming a type 2 
player and specify the reasons why he or he or she should be elected. You can 
communicate with other team members through the chat. Type 2 player is elected by 
simple majority voting (to be elected you need 2 votes). If the team cannot choose type 2 
player during 3 attempts, a random type 2 player is selected. The difference between type 
1 player and type 2 player will be explained below. Type 2 player is chosen for the 
entire length of Part 2 and cannot be changed. 
 
After the type 2 player is selected, the team receives 17 choice problems (one problem per 
round). For example:  
 
Sample Problem 1 
 
You need to choose one of the following two projects: 
Project A Project B 
Your team receives €40 with probability 
3
1  
(each type 1 player receives €10 and type 2 
player receives €20) 
Your team receives €7 with probability 
3
1  
(each type 1 player receives €3 and type 2 
player receives €1) 
Your team receives €2.50 with probability 
3
2  (each type 1 player receives €1 and type 
2 player receives €0.50) 
Your team receives €16 with probability 
3
2  
(each type 1 player receives €5 and type 2 
player receives €6) 
 
Note, that if the project is successful (yields its highest possible payoff), type 2 player 
receives more than any of the type 1 players in the majority of projects. However, if 
the project is unsuccessful (yields its lowest possible payoff), type 2 player receives 
less than other players in the majority of projects.  
 
All members of the team vote on the projects and reach an intermediate decision. The 
intermediate decision is reached as soon as at least 2 players have voted for the same 
project (simple majority). The intermediate decision is reported to the type 2 player (no 
one else can see the intermediate decision). The type 2 player can either confirm or alter 
the team’s decision. Type 2 player reports the final decision, which is either an 
intermediate decision or his/her own decision. The team’s payoff is calculated based on 
the final decision, reported by the type 2 player. The final decision of the type 2 player 
is reported to the entire team. If the type 2 player confirms the intermediate decision, final 
decision = intermediate decision; if the type 2 player changes the intermediate decision, 
final decision = his/her own decision.  
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At the end of Part 3, when decisions on all choice problems are made, the computer 
program will select one of 17 rounds at random and your payoff from this round only 
will be paid to you. This problem will re-appear on your computer screen. The computer 
program will simulate projects which were under consideration in selected problem, and 
your payoff from Part 2 will be displayed.  
 
For example, imagine that the team’s intermediate decision (for Problem 1 shown above) 
was to choose Project B. However, the type 2 player decided to change the team decision 
and made his/her own decision to select Project A. This means that the final decision of the 
team was to choose Project A. At the end of Part 3 of the experiment, Problem 1 will re-
appear on your screen and the computer program will simulate both project A and B. 
Assume, that Project A turns out to yield €40. You will see the team payoff of €40 and a 
forgone payoff (the payoff that you could have earned in this round had you chosen 
another investment project) of €16 and your private payoff (€10 for each type 1 player 
and €20 for the type 2 player) along with your private forgone payoff (€5 for each type 1 
player and €6 for the type 2 player) on your screen. You will also be informed on whether 
the intermediate decision of your team was confirmed or changed by the type 2 player. 
You will receive your private payoff and not your team payoff at the end of Part 3.  
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